Women directors and disclosure of intellectual capital information by ​Tejedo-Romero, Francisca et al.
IW
F
a
b
c
d
a
A
R
R
A
A
J
M
O
G
K
W
D
I
D
1
t
t
e
l
i
R
l
b
o
m
i
t
c
a
m
l
R
2
nARTICLE IN PRESSG ModelEDEEN-26; No. of Pages 9
European Research on Management and Business Economics xxx (2017) xxx–xxx
www.elsev ier .es /ermbe
omen  directors  and  disclosure  of  intellectual  capital  information
rancisca  Tejedo-Romeroa,∗,  Lúcia  Lima  Rodriguesb, Russell  Craigc,d
Universidad de Castilla-La Mancha, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales, Plaza de la Universidad, 1, 02071 Albacete, Spain
University of Minho, GOVCOPP, Gualtar Campus, Braga 4709, Portugal
Portsmouth Business School, Richmond Building, Portland Street, Portsmouth, Hampshire PO1 3DE, UK
Victoria University, College of Business, Melbourne 8001, Australia
 r  t i  c  l  e  i  n  f  o
rticle history:
eceived 4 May  2016
eceived in revised form 6 June 2017
ccepted 10 June 2017
vailable online xxx
EL classiﬁcation:
14
a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
This  paper  uses  a resource-based  perspective  and  balanced  panel  data  analysis  to  explore  whether  the
representation  of women  on the  boards  of directors  of  Spanish  companies  is associated  with  an  increase
in  voluntary  disclosure  of  information  concerning  intellectual  capital  [IC]. We  ﬁnd that  gender  diversity
is  a complementary  corporate  governance  mechanism  that  has  a  signiﬁcant  positive  effect  on  levels  of
disclosure  of  IC information.  This  appears  due  to the presence  of  women  on  boards  serving  to prompt
stronger  monitoring  and  oversight  behaviour.  Our  ﬁndings  should  encourage  support  for  policies  that
will  increase  current  levels  of  representation  of  women  on  corporate  boards  and  inﬂuence  the  setting  of
corporate  governance  requirements  relating  to disclosure  by  capital  market  regulators.34
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. Introduction
We  respond to a call to generate “knowledge and insights
hat can compel positive change in the representation and sta-
us of women on corporate boards” (Bilimoria, 2000, p. 25). We
xplore whether representation of women on boards increases the
evel of voluntary disclosure of intellectual capital [IC] information,
ncluding disclosures of knowledge-based intangibles (Erickson &
othberg, 2015).
This study is timely because of the recent profusion of regu-
atory recommendations regarding gender balance on corporate
oards (Masselot & Maymont, 2015). Increasing the representation
f women on company boards has fast become a policy goal for
any national governments (Senden & Visser, 2013). This study is
mportant too because of the strong inﬂuence IC now has on long-
erm corporate value. If stakeholders are informed fully about how aPlease cite this article in press as: Tejedo-Romero, F., et al. Women  dire
Research on Management and Business Economics (2017), http://dx.doi
ompany manages IC, they can better assess its capacity to sustain,
nd increase, long-term value. However, because access to infor-
ation regarding IC generally has been asymmetric, stakeholders
∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: Francisca.Tejedo@uclm.es (F. Tejedo-Romero),
rodrigues@eeg.uminho.pt (L.L. Rodrigues), Russell.Craig@port.ac.uk,
ussell.Craig@vu.edu.au (R. Craig).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.iedeen.2017.06.003
444-8834/© 2017 AEDEM. Published by Elsevier Espan˜a, S.L.U. This is an open access ar
d/4.0/).rely strongly on voluntary disclosures of IC to inform their decision
making (Tejedo-Romero, 2016).
The ﬁrst regulatory initiatives seeking gender balance on com-
pany boards were instituted in 2003 in Norway. Public companies
were required to have at least 40 percent of either gender as
board members by 2008. Such initiatives have spread throughout
the world. For example, the Indian Companies Bill 2012 recom-
mended that company boards include at least one woman  director
(Kamalnaath & Peddada, 2012). In Malaysia, the Code of Corporate
Governance (2012) required public companies to have at least 30
per cent of women  on their boards by 2016. In 2012, the European
Union [EU] required publicly listed companies in member countries
to voluntarily increase women  on boards to 30% by 2015, and 40%
by 2020 (EU, 2012). In Spain, the Equality Law (Law 3/2007) pressed
companies to increase the proportion of women on boards to 40%
by 2015.1
The empirical data we  draw on are sourced in the voluntary dis-ctors and disclosure of intellectual capital information. European
.org/10.1016/j.iedeen.2017.06.003
closures regarding IC that were made in 125 sustainability reports
of major Spanish companies, 2007–2011. The decision to study
Spain is motivated by the historically low level of representation
1 For further review of the global response to demands to increase female board
participation, including discussion of the beneﬁts of female representation, see Ben-
Amar, Chang, and McIlkenny (2017).
ticle under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-
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f women on boards in that country. In 2013, the European Com-
ission (EC) reported that women represented 12.3% of board
embers of Spain’s largest listed companies (IBEX 35 index), well
elow the EU average of 15.8%. The rate of increase of women  on
oards in Spain between 2003 and 2012 was 1% per annum. The
C observed that “at this rate of change, boards with at least 40% of
ach gender are 30 odd years away and the 2015 deadline stipulated
n the quota law of 2007 will pass unmet” (EC, 2013).
We adopt a resource-based perspective to contend that boards
erform better if members have diverse views, skills and profes-
ional experience (including in terms of gender). We  conduct static
nd dynamic panel data analysis of the impact on IC disclosures of
he representation of women on boards. We  isolate the “propor-
ion of women on boards” as the principal independent variable.
ender diversity is found to be statistically signiﬁcant (1% level) in
xplaining the level of disclosure of IC information. When controls
re introduced for four corporate governance characteristics (board
ize, board activity, independent directors, and ownership concen-
ration) and three company characteristics (company size, listing
n a sustainability index, and industry), gender diversity remains
igniﬁcant (1% level).
The variable “external independent directors” is related nega-
ively to disclosures of IC information (10% level). Thus, voluntary
isclosure of IC decreases slightly as the number of external inde-
endent directors increases – in contrast to the effect of appointing
omen to boards. The presence of more independent directors
ppears to substitute for the need to disclose more information.
e ﬁnd too that a higher level of board activity (as measured by
he number of board meetings) means a slightly lower level of IC
isclosure (signiﬁcant at the 10% level). Board size and ownership
oncentration are not signiﬁcant. In terms of ﬁrms’ characteristics,
ize and industry are related positively to IC disclosure (5% level)
nd listing in sustainable indexes (10% level).
This study adds to the corpus of empirical evidence that
as investigated whether increased representation of women on
oards leads to favourable outcomes for stakeholders and improves
oard effectiveness. The ﬁndings aid understanding of how gen-
er diversity increases voluntary disclosures (in this case of IC
nformation) in listed companies. The study reveals that increased
epresentation of women on boards is likely to improve board over-
ight, enhance transparency, and reduce information asymmetry
n respect of IC information. The results partially vindicate public
olicy in Spain (and other countries) which impose(s) quotas on
he representation of women on company boards. Resource-based
erspectives help to explain the positive contribution of women in
erms of the different personal-social attributes, and the gender-
elated values they bring to boards (Eckes & Trautner, 2000).
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section
 reviews relevant literature and outlines the regulatory setting
n Spain. Section 3 describes research method. Section 4 presents
esults and discusses ﬁndings. Section 5 draws conclusions and
nters recommendations for further research.
. Theoretical framework and regulatory setting
Despite strong research into the effects of corporate governance
n disclosure (Cerbioni & Parbonetti, 2007) much is still to be
earnt about the effect of corporate governance on the quantity
nd quality of voluntary disclosures (including of IC information).
nderstanding the effect that the appointment of women to boards
f directors has on voluntary disclosures is inadequate, especiallyPlease cite this article in press as: Tejedo-Romero, F., et al. Women  dire
Research on Management and Business Economics (2017), http://dx.doi
n societies such as Spain which are viewed predominantly as “mas-
uline.” The lingering legacy of the Franco regime (1939–1975)
enders Spain an ideal setting to study the traction gender diver-
ity initiatives are having on corporate behaviour. Franco “actively PRESS
ent and Business Economics xxx (2017) xxx–xxx
opposed the advancement of women’s rights [. . .]  and established
numerous policies against women’s paid employment” (Valiente,
2002, p. 767, p. 773).
2.1. Theoretical framework
Our central premise is that increased representation of women
on boards is associated with an increase in voluntary disclo-
sures of IC information. Theoretical support for this premise is
provided by resource-based perspectives (Arroyo, Fuentes, de, &
Jiménez, 2016). In particular, a board of directors provides a valu-
able resource that renders competitive advantage to a ﬁrm (Arosa,
Iturralde, & Maseda, 2013; Branco & Rodrigues, 2006). The EU
Corporate Governance Framework (2011) points out that board
members should have diverse views, skills and professional expe-
rience – these are all value-creation characteristics emphasised
by resource-based perspectives. Diversity in members’ proﬁles
(including gender) gives the board a range of competencies, a pool
of resources and expertise, a set of different leadership experiences,
and a capacity to generate new ideas (Quintana García, 2016).
Women  directors invest a board with leadership behaviour that
is communal, is strong in considering strategic issues and poli-
cies pertaining to corporate social responsibility, and possesses “a
concern with the welfare of other people and being affectionate,
helpful, kind, sympathetic, interpersonally sensitive, nurturing and
gentle” (Neilsen & Huse, 2010, p. 138). The EU Green Paper (2011)
considers diversiﬁed expertise essential in ensuring that a board
understands a company’s ﬁnancial objectives, and the impact of its
business on different stakeholders. Gender diversity is considered
to enhance the collective intelligence of a board and to “contribute
to increasing the pool of talent available for a company’s highest
management and oversight functions” (p. 7). (For further review of
the beneﬁts of board gender diversity, see Liao, Luo, & Tang, 2015).
Gender representation regulations have been based on belief
that women will improve commercial effectiveness (Quintana
García, 2016) by increasing the competency, expertise, collec-
tive judgement, and intelligence of a board (EC, 2011). There
is strong contention that company performance will improve
because women are better than men  at multi-tasking, risk man-
agement and communication (Schubert, 2006); and because they
have a “more participative and process-oriented” communication
style (Lucas-Pérez, Mínguez-Vera, Baixauli-Soler, Martín-Ugedo,
& Sánchez-Marín, 2015, p. 267). Additionally, because women
directors bring different viewpoints to the boardroom, they will
inevitably increase transparency and reduce information asym-
metry (Srinidhi, Gul, & Tsui, 2011, p. 1613). In this regard, Abad,
Lucas-Pérez, and Minguez-Vera (2015, p. 23) report evidence from
Spain “that gender-diverse boards improve the information envi-
ronment by ameliorating information asymmetry problems” in the
capital market.
Two major factors explain the propensity of women direc-
tors to reduce information asymmetry. The ﬁrst is that women
employ “a more trust-building leadership style than men”, such
that their commitment to “trust-building requires more informa-
tion exchange and lower information asymmetry” (Srinidhi et al.,
2011, p. 1614). The second is that “female directors exhibit greater
diligence in monitoring” (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Srinidhi et al.,
2011, p. 1611). Better monitoring by gender-diverse boards is
claimed to lead to better oversight of managers, enhanced trans-
parency, and a “richer information environment” (Lucas-Pérez
et al., 2015, p. 267). Such an environment is likely to witness the
disclosure of IC information because higher levels of representationctors and disclosure of intellectual capital information. European
.org/10.1016/j.iedeen.2017.06.003
of women on boards “implies a better knowledge of the market and
better identiﬁcation with customers and employees” (Lucas-Pérez
et al., 2015, p. 268). Market, customer and employee matters are
strong components of IC disclosures. Furthermore, studies have
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ound that women directors are more diligent than male direc-
ors (Huse & Solberg, 2006). They are better monitors (Adams &
erreira, 2009), more innovative (Torchia, Calabrò, & Huse, 2011),
nd stronger advocates for “community values” (Swartz & Firer,
005) and “women’s issues” (Huse & Solberg, 2006).
Swartz and Firer (2005, p. 151) highlight the important con-
ection of IC with “a company’s reputation with its external
takeholders, including the community.” They argue “that boards of
irectors with a higher percentage of women will make decisions
n the future intellectual capital performance of the entity with
ore sensitivity to community concerns than male-only boards” (p.
51). Boulouta (2013, p.188) offers support by arguing that women
n boards “are likely to comply with the feminine stereotype,” be
ore socially sensitive, have greater concerns for “soft” issues, and
ave “a positive impact on board tasks of a qualitative nature, such
s strategic and CSR [corporate social responsibility] issues” (p. 187)
also see Liao et al., 2015). Empirical support for Boulouta’s view is
eported in Ben-Amar, et al.’s (2017) study of Canadian companies,
008–2014: the likelihood of voluntary climate-change disclosures
ncreased as the percentage of women on boards increased. Simi-
arly, based on a study of practice in 22 countries, Fernandez-Feijoo
t al. (2014) showed that boards with more women disclose more
SR information. Furthermore, Lucas-Pérez et al. (2015, p. 267) con-
luded that women “exert a better inﬂuence on the ﬁrm on tasks
elated to corporate social responsibility [CSR] and strategic con-
rol.” Consistent with the literature cited above, and the conclusion
f Swartz and Firer (2005) that the presence of women on boards
as a positive effect on IC performance, there are strong grounds
o believe that increased representation of women  on boards will
ncrease disclosures of IC information.
Prior studies of whether gender diversity of directors inﬂu-
nces decisions about information disclosure have been based on
xpectation that gender diversity will increase levels of volun-
ary disclosure. However, the ﬁndings are not unanimous. Nalikka
2009) examined the impact of directors’ gender on voluntary
isclosures in company annual reports (for 2005–2007) of 108 com-
anies listed on the Helsinki Stock Exchange. She found that the
roportion of women board members did not have a signiﬁcant
mpact on levels of voluntary disclosure. In contrast, Barako and
rown’s (2008) study of Kenyan banks found that the representa-
ion of women on boards was associated positively with the extent
f CSR information disclosed voluntarily in annual reports. Drawing
rom the above, the following hypothesis is examined:
1. The higher the proportion of women directors on the board,
he higher the voluntary disclosure of information about IC.
.2. Spanish setting
In the past twenty years, the Spanish Stock Exchange Commis-
ion (Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores, referred to as CNMV)
as published three major corporate governance “best practice”
eports (Aldama Report, 2003; Código Uniﬁcado de Buen Gobierno
orporativo, 2006 [CUBGC] [Uniﬁed Code of Good Corporate
overnance], updated in 2013; Olivencia Report, 1998). In 2003, the
ldama Report emphasised the need to increase the transparency
f listed companies. In 2006, amendments to the Fourth Euro-
ean Directive (78/660/EEC) required issuers of securities traded
n a regulated market to incorporate an annual corporate gover-
ance section in their management reports. The CUBGC was issued
n 2006 (and updated in 2013) to promote ethical behaviour in
orporate governance. The CUBGC (2006, 2013) has directed thatPlease cite this article in press as: Tejedo-Romero, F., et al. Women  dire
Research on Management and Business Economics (2017), http://dx.doi
ompanies without female board representation should appoint
emale candidates to any board vacancy. This directive was consis-
ent with Spanish Law 2/2007 requiring a quota of 40% of women
n corporate boards by 2015. PRESS
ent and Business Economics xxx (2017) xxx–xxx 3
To increase the efﬁciency and quality of decision making, the
CUBGC (2006, 2013) recommended a board size of between 5 and
15 members, and that at least one third of directors should be
independent. To help a board exercise oversight and monitoring,
the CUBGC recommended regular board meetings, and the estab-
lishment of a range of board committees. Some of these had been
mandated previously by other regulatory initiatives. For example,
in 2003, the Aldama Report recommended that boards establish an
Executive Committee, a Nomination and Compensation Commit-
tee, and a Strategy and Investment Committee.
3. Research method
3.1. Sample and data
The sample analysed comprises sustainability reports of all 25
companies listed continuously on Spain’s IBEX 35 share market
index from 2007 to 2011. Sustainability reports are a major means
of business communication to stakeholders (Rodríguez Gutiérrez,
Fuentes García, & Sánchez Can˜izares, 2013; Tejedo-Romero, 2016)
and feature a high rate of IC reporting (Oliveira, Rodrigues, &
Craig, 2010a). They contain more IC information than the annual
report, due to overlap between IC information and sustainability
information (especially in the economic part of the sustainability
report) (Cinquini, Passetti, Tenucci, & Frey, 2012; Tejedo-Romero,
2016). Companies report IC information in sustainability reports to
improve transparency, attain social legitimacy, and enhance rep-
utation (Cinquini et al., 2012). In Spain, sustainability reports are
issued voluntarily. They have been found to be better suited than
annual reports for analyzing levels of voluntary disclosure of IC
information (Tejedo-Romero, 2016).
During the analysis period several companies listed on IBEX
35 introduced a “combined report”: an annual report containing a
clearly demarcated sustainability report. Where this occurred, we
focused on information disclosed in the sustainability report sec-
tion. One company presented combined reports for all ﬁve years;
three companies for four years; four for two  years; and none for one
year. Thus, the source data relied on comprised 125 company-year
observations (25 companies for 5 years). These were drawn from
100 standalone sustainability reports and 25 combined reports. All
were accessed on company web sites.
Balanced panel data analysis was  used to test H1, consistent
with Oliveira, Rodrigues, and Craig (2010b) and Pérez-Calero and
Barroso-Castro (2015). The number of time periods (t) was the same
for all companies. Panel data permitted the control of unobserved
individual and/or time-speciﬁc heterogeneity that was  correlated
with explanatory variables (Baltagi, 2014). By combining time-
series and cross-sectional data, unobservable individual-speciﬁc
effects (possibly correlated with other explanatory variables) were
controlled too (Hausman & Taylor, 1981). The industry member-
ship proﬁle of the 25 sample companies was  Consumer Services
(2), Financial Services and Real Estate (7), Oil and Energy (6), Basic
Materials, Industry and Construction (7), Consumer Goods (1), and
Technology and Telecommunications (2). There were ﬁve observa-
tions per company, making 125 in total.
3.2. Measurement of variables
To explore which IC information is disclosed voluntarily, the
chosen dependent variable was an IC disclosure index (ICI). This
was constructed using content analysis (Rodríguez Gutiérrez et al.,ctors and disclosure of intellectual capital information. European
.org/10.1016/j.iedeen.2017.06.003
2013; Tejedo-Romero, 2016). Disclosure indexes calculate “the
number of information-related items that a given report contains
based on a pre-deﬁned list of the possible items” (Bukh, Nielsen,
Gormsen, & Mouritsen, 2005, p. 719). The items comprising the ICI
Please cite this article in press as: Tejedo-Romero, F., et al. Women  dire
Research on Management and Business Economics (2017), http://dx.doi
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Table  1
Intellectual capital items disclosed by ﬁrms.
Items Observations
Max  n = 125
(%)
2007–2011
Strategy
1. Corporate governance 113 90.40
2.  New products/services and
technology
56 44.80
3.  Investments in new business 14 11.20
4.  Strategic alliances or agreements 98 78.40
5.  Acquisitions and mergers 32 25.60
6.  Leadership 107 85.60
7.  Network of suppliers and
distributors
35 28.00
8.  Supplier evaluation policy 118 94.40
9.  Image and brand 125 100.00
10.  Corporate culture 117 93.60
11.  Best practices 104 83.20
12.  Organisational structure 67 53.60
13.  Environmental investments 80 64.00
14.  Community involvement 118 94.40
15.  Corporate social responsibility
objectives
125 100.00
16.  Shareholders’ structure 89 71.20
17.  Price policy 3 2.40
18.  Business vision, objectives and
consistency of strategy
115 92.00
19.  Quality of products/services 80 64.00
20.  Marketing activities 35 28.00
21.  Stakeholder
relationships/engagement
120 96.00
22.  Risk management 110 88.00
Processes
1.  Working environment, safety,
hygiene
125 100.00
2.  Internal sharing of knowledge
and information
117 93.60
3.  External sharing of knowledge
and information
119 95.20
4.  Measure of internal or external
failures
42 33.60
5.  Environmental approvals and
statements/policies
118 94.40
6.  Utilisation of energy. raw
materials and other input goods
125 100.00
7.  Efﬁciency 112 89.60
8.  Business model 119 95.20
9.  Litigations/law suits/sanctions 82 65.60
10.  Quality approvals and
statements/policies
109 87.20
I&R&D
1.  Policy, strategy and/or objectives
of IRD activities
71 56.80
2.  IRD expenses 57 45.60
3.  IRD in basic research 10 8.00
4.  IRD in product
design/development
39 31.20
5.  Futures projects or projects in
course regarding IRD
38 30.40
6.  Details of ﬁrm patents 5 4.00
7.  Patents, licences, papers, etc. 15 12.00
8.  Patents pending 9 7.20
Technology
1.  Investments in information
technology–description
6 4.80
2.  Information technology systems
and facilities
93 74.40
3.  Software assets 0 0.00
4.  Web  transactions 29 23.20
5.  Number of visits to the web 77 61.60
Customers
1.  Number of customers 54 43.20
2.  Sales breakdown by customer 13 10.40
3.  Annual sales per segment or
product
34 27.20
4.  Average customer size 1 0.80
5.  Customer relationships 102 81.60
Table 1 (Continued)
Items Observations
Max  n = 125
(%)
2007–2011
6. Customer satisfaction/survey 97 77.60
7.  Education/training of customers 4 3.20
8.  Customers per employee 0 0.00
9.  Value added per customer or
segment
6 4.80
10.  Market share by
country/segment/product
25 20.00
11.  Relative market share to
competitors
5 4.00
12.  Customer seniority and loyalty 10 8.00
13.  Customer complaints 92 73.60
14.  New customers 17 13.60
Human Capital
1. Labour and Unions 120 96.00
2.  Staff involvement with the
community
70 56.00
3.  Staff entrepreneurship (new
ideas)
44 35.20
4.  Staff by age 90 72.00
5.  Staff by gender 122 97.60
6.  Staff by job function/business
area
99 79.20
7.  Staff by level of education 42 33.60
8.  Staff by geographic area/by
country
110 88.00
9.  Staff by type of contract 109 87.20
10.  Staff turnover 102 81.60
11.  Changes in number of
employees
111 88.80
12.  Staff health and safety 122 97.60
13.  Absenteeism 87 69.60
14.  Staff interview/employee
survey
47 37.60
15.  Policy on competence
development
110 88.00
16.  Description of competence
development activities
32 25.60
17.  Education and training policy 122 97.60
18.  Education and training
expenses
97 77.60
19.  Education and training
hours/number of employees
92 73.60
20.  Employee expenses/number of
employees
11 8.80
21.  Recruitment policies 84 67.20
22.  Job rotation opportunities 93 74.40
23.  Career opportunities 63 50.40
24.  Remuneration and evaluation
systems
114 91.20
25.  Incentive systems and fringe
beneﬁts
99 79.20
26.  Pensions 47 37.60
27.  Value added/employee or
production/employee
5 4.00
28.  Employee quality and
experience
81 64.80
29.  Management quality and
experience
11 8.80were chosen cautiously, inﬂuenced by the studies of Bukh et al.
(2005), Oliveira et al. (2010a), and Tejedo-Romero (2016).
Five randomly chosen reports were pilot tested to modify the
initially constructed index so that it better reﬂected the diverse
nature of IC items companies could disclose. The ﬁnal list shown
in Table 1 includes 88 IC items (Strategy 22; Processes 10; Innova-
tion, Research and Development 8; Technology 5; Customers 14;
Human Capital 29). Manual coding was  used because software-
assisted searches for words, sentences, or portions of pages, arectors and disclosure of intellectual capital information. European
.org/10.1016/j.iedeen.2017.06.003
insufﬁciently robust to capture the nature of IC disclosures (Beattie
& Thomson, 2007).
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The total disclosure score reported is the unweighted sum of
he scores of each item, consistent with Oliveira et al. (2010a) and
ejedo-Romero (2016). All items were assumed to be relevant to all
rms. No particular stakeholder was the subject of special focus. All
takeholders were of interest because different stakeholders confer
ifferent levels of importance to individual information items. An
ssumption of equal weights for all items was viewed as likely to
esult in a smaller bias than from assigning subjective (and differ-
nt) weights to items (Lopes & Rodrigues, 2007). Thus, the total ICI
core for a company was  calculated as:
CI =
m∑
i=1
di
m
here di = 0 or 1, and di = 0 if the disclosure item is found; di = 1 if
he disclosure item is not found; and m = the maximum number of
tems a company can disclose (88).
Content analysis of the entire sample was informed by our prior
oding of an initial sample of ﬁve reports. The inter-rater reliabil-
ty measure obtained (Scott’s pi = 0.80) is considered acceptable in
nalysing corporate report disclosures (Hackston & Milne, 1996).
Table 1 reveals disclosure levels for items comprising the sub-
ndexes. The results are consistent with analysis by Oliveira et al.
2010a) of voluntary disclosures of IC items in sustainability reports
or 2006 of Portuguese ﬁrms. The major items reported in the sub-
ndexes were: Strategy: image and brand (100%), CSR and objective
100%), stakeholder relationships/engagement (96%); Processes:
fforts related to the working environment (100%), utilisation of
nergy, raw materials and other input goods (100%); Innovation,
esearch and development (I&R&D): policy strategy and/or objec-
ives of I&R&D activities (57%); Technology: information technology
ystems and facilities (74%); Customers:  customer relationships
82%); and Human capital: staff by gender (98%), staff health and
afety (98%), education and training policy (98%).
The independent variable (gender diversity) was  measured by
he proportion of women directors on a board (Barako & Brown,
008; Prado-Lorenzo & García-Sánchez, 2010). The seven control
ariables comprised four corporate governance variables and three
ompany variables, explained immediately below.
.2.1. Corporate Governance variables
Board size is deﬁned as the number of directors on a board (Arosa
t al., 2013; Pérez-Calero & Barroso-Castro, 2015). Despite claims
hat the monitoring capacity of boards increases with the number of
irectors, Lipton and Lorsh (1992) suggested limiting boards to ten
embers, with a preferred size of eight or nine. However, although
arger boards could improve monitoring and diversity, this could be
utweighed by the costs of slower decision making and less candid
iscussions of managerial performance (Arosa et al., 2013; Lipton
 Lorsh, 1992).
Several studies have reported a quadratic relationship between
oard size and economic performance (e.g., López & Morrós, 2014),
orporate social disclosure (Cormier, Ledoux, & Magnan, 2011);
nd IC disclosure (Hidalgo, García-Meca, & Martínez, 2011). Thus,
here appears to be an inverted “U” relationship, with the opti-
al  board size being the mid-point number of directors (Cerbioni
 Parbonetti, 2007; Cormier et al., 2011; Hidalgo et al., 2011;
rado-Lorenzo & García-Sánchez, 2010). To control for potential
iminishing marginal effects on IC disclosure after the optimal
oard size is passed, the square of the “board size” variable was
onsidered also.Please cite this article in press as: Tejedo-Romero, F., et al. Women  dire
Research on Management and Business Economics (2017), http://dx.doi
Board activity is represented by the number of board meetings
uring a ﬁnancial year (Arosa et al., 2013). There are explanations
or, and against, the existence of a positive relationship between
he frequency of meetings and efﬁciency. Boards whose meetings PRESS
ent and Business Economics xxx (2017) xxx–xxx 5
are more frequent have been found to monitor management more
effectively and to be more diligent (Lipton & Lorsh, 1992). Thus, a
company with an active board is likely to increase levels of disclo-
sure to publicise work undertaken. On the other hand, given that
the CEO is charged with setting the agenda of board meetings, and
that routine tasks compose a large proportion of the board’s time,
more meetings do not necessarily imply better monitoring (Andres,
Azofra, & Lopez, 2005, p. 200). There appears to be an inverted “U”
relationship, with optimal board activity identiﬁed in terms of a
midpoint number of meetings. To control for potential diminishing
marginal effects on IC disclosure after the optimal level of board
activity is passed, the square of the “board activity” variable was
considered also.
Independent directors represents the percentage of indepen-
dent directors on a board (Arosa et al., 2013; Hidalgo et al.,
2011; Pérez-Calero & Barroso-Castro, 2015). Some previous stud-
ies have concluded that as the percentage of independent directors
increases, so too does the level of voluntary disclosure (Cerbioni &
Parbonetti, 2007). Nevertheless, the presence of more independent
directors can substitute for the need to disclose more information.
Indeed, an increase of independent directors was  found to reduce
voluntary disclosure in Singaporean ﬁrms (Eng & Mak, 2003).
Ownership concentration is the proportion of ordinary shares
owned by substantial shareholders (those holding equity of 5% or
more) (Hidalgo et al., 2011). This is a relevant variable because the
business context of listed Spanish companies is characterised by
high levels of ownership concentration. Many prior studies have
reported an inverse relationship between ownership concentration
and voluntary disclosure (Firer & Williams, 2005).
3.2.2. Company characteristic variables
Company size is the number of employees of a company (Bukh
et al., 2005). Many studies have found that ﬁrm size has a positive
effect on levels of disclosure (Lopes & Rodrigues, 2007; Oliveira,
Rodrigues, & Craig, 2006).
Industry is represented by a dummy  variable with a value of 1 if a
company is in a sensitive industry, and 0 otherwise. Sensitive indus-
tries were regarded to be “Financial Services and Real Estate”; “Oil
and Energy”; and “Technology and Telecommunications” (Sierra-
García, García-Benau, & Zorio, 2014). All other industries classiﬁed
by the CNMV were considered non-sensitive (“Basic Materials”,
“Industry and Construction”; and “Consumer Goods”). More vol-
untary information about IC was  expected to be disclosed by ﬁrms
in sensitive industries (Kolk & Perego, 2010).
Listing on a sustainability index was represented by a dummy
variable with a value of 1 if the company is included in at least
one major sustainability index (e.g., Dow Jones Sustainability Index
[DJSI] or FTSE4Good), and 0 otherwise (Prado-Lorenzo, Rodríguez-
Domínguez, Gallego-Álvarez, & García-Sánchez, 2009). The DJSI,
launched in 1999, tracks the ﬁnancial performance of leading
sustainability-driven companies worldwide. It includes companies
that “follow a best-in-class approach, including companies across
all industries that outperform their peers in numerous sustaina-
bility metrics.” This variable was included as a proxy for reputation:
if a company belonged to these indices, it was  considered “best-in-
class” (Michelon & Parbonetti, 2012).
4. Results
4.1. Descriptive statistics and univariate analysisctors and disclosure of intellectual capital information. European
.org/10.1016/j.iedeen.2017.06.003
Descriptive statistics for the observed disclosure levels of the
main ICI index and the six sub-indexes are available on request to
the lead author. Disclosure of the 88 ICI items ranged from 25% to
74%. On average, each company disclosed information about 56% of
 ING ModelI
6 anagem
t
i
a
w
c
a
9
1
o
m
7
m
a
C
4
s
y
s
4
i
(
I
w
i
c
t
t
I
epen
 ˇ8S
ctivit
it + ˇ
f
d
i
w
d
P

p
a
m
n
&
i
o
e
p
d
a
I
We conﬁrm the previous results for Model 3, although the gen-
der variable is only signiﬁcant at 10%. We  could not conﬁrm the
quadratic relationship between board size and IC disclosure; andARTICLEEDEEN-26; No. of Pages 9
 F. Tejedo-Romero et al. / European Research on M
he 88 disclosure items, with a standard deviation of 10%. In the sub-
ndexes, there was a substantial range of disclosure. The highest
verage level was for Processes (85%) and the lowest average level
as for I&R&D (24%). Descriptive statistics for the independent and
ontrol variables for the 125 company-year observations are avail-
ble on request to the lead author. On average, women  comprised
.7% of board members. There was an increase from 6.9% in 2007 to
2.4% in 2011. The progress in increasing the proportion of women
n boards was slow when juxtaposed against the Spanish govern-
ent’s target of 40% by 2015 (Equality Law of 2007, articles 60 and
5).
Board size ranged from 8 to 24, with a mean of 15. This is
uch greater than the ideal size of 8 or 9 suggested by Lipton
nd Lorsh (1992). It is at the upper range recommended by the
UBGC (2006, 2013). On average, boards met  11 times per year;
2% of directors were independent; and approximately one third of
hareholders had equity of 5% or more. Sixty per cent of company-
ear observations were in sensitive industries. Companies listed on
ustainability indices comprised 87% of observations.
.2. Models
The ICI score is a linear combination of explanatory variables,
ncluding gender diversity (Gender) and a vector of control variables
Z). Mathematically, the principal model is expressed as:
CIit =  ˛ + ˇ1Genderit + ˇ2Zit + it (1)
here  ˛ is a scalar; ˇ1 and ˇ2 are the estimable parameter vectors;
 = 1, . . .,  25; t = 2007, . . ..,  2011; i represents the unobservable
ompany-speciﬁc effect; ıt represents the unobservable speciﬁc
ime effect (common to all companies); εit is the remainder stochas-
ic disturbance term, and it = i + ıt + εit.
The following models were explored:
Model 1:
CIit =  ˛ + ˇ1Genderit + it (2)
Model 2:
ICIit =  ˛ + ˇ1Genderit + ˇ2BoardSizeit + ˇ3BoardActivityit + ˇ4Ind
+ ˇ5OwnershipConcentrationit + ˇ6Sizeit + ˇ7Industryit +
Model 3:
ICIit =  ˛ + ˇ1Genderit + ˇ2BoardSizeit + ˇ3BoardSize2it + ˇ4BoardA
+ ˇ6IndependentDirectorsit + ˇ7OwnershipConcentration
We  used panel data to estimate Eqs. (2)–(4). There were two dif-
erent approaches for each model. The ﬁrst estimated static panel
ata regression models of ICI as a function of gender diversity,
ncluding various controls. The four estimator panels considered
ere: Pooled Ordinary Least Squares (POLS), Fixed Effects (FE), Ran-
om Effects (RE), and Generalised Method of Moments (GMM). The
OLS estimator assumes that all i and ıt are equal. By allowing
i and ıt to differ, but assuming they are ﬁxed numbers, the FE
anel was generated. The RE panel assumes that unobserved effects
re random variables. The GMM  is an instrumental-variable (IV)
ethod based on the fact that ﬁxed and random effects models do
ot use all the information available in a given sample (Pérez-Calero
 Barroso-Castro, 2015). Second, we also tested for dynamic effects
n each model. Dynamic panel data estimation addresses the impact
f past ICI on the present through the inclusion of a lagged depend-
nt variable. A dynamic approach such as this seems likely to be
articularly relevant for the relationship between ICI and genderPlease cite this article in press as: Tejedo-Romero, F., et al. Women  dire
Research on Management and Business Economics (2017), http://dx.doi
iversity. This approach leads to a dynamic speciﬁcation for ICIit,
s:
CIit =  ˛ ICIit−1 + ˇ1Genderit + ˇ2Zit + it (5) PRESS
ent and Business Economics xxx (2017) xxx–xxx
dentDirectorsit
ustainabilityIndexesit + it
(3)
yit + ˇ5BoardActivity2it
8Sizeit + ˇ9Industryit + ˇ10SustainabilityIndexesit + it
(4)
Table 2 presents panel data regressions for the three models. In
the static approach, columns 2–5 are for Model 1, columns 7–10 are
for Model 2, columns 12–15 are for Model 3. To determine whether
the correct estimator was used, we  applied the Breusch–Pagan
Lagrange Multiplier [LM] Test, the F-test for FE, and the Hausman
Speciﬁcation test (Wooldridge, 2002). The Breusch–Pagan LM Test
(p-value = 0.00) conﬁrmed that the RE model was more appropriate
than the pooled OLS model. The F-test showed that the FE model
was more appropriate than the POLS model (p-value = 0.00). To
identify the most appropriate model (FE or RE), we applied the
Hausman test. The RE model was  the most suitable for Model 1
(X21 = 0.01, P > X21 = 0.9242). The FE model was more appropri-
ate for Models 2 and 3 (X27 = 20.12,  P > X29 = 0.0053; and X29 =
20.29, P > X29 = 0.0162, respectively).
The appropriateness of the FE model was investigated further
by testing for autocorrelation, heteroskedasticity, and contempo-
raneous correlation. This detected heteroskedasticity in the models
(X225 = 11278.50,  p = 0.0000; X225 = 18454.56, p-value = 0.0000,
respectively), thereby supporting use of the GMM  method.
Therefore, we  used a static panel estimation, known as Sys-
tem GMM2 (Arellano & Bover, 1995). This approach is based on
a system of two simultaneous equations, one in ﬁrst differences,
and the other in levels. To address potential endogeneity in the
regressors, lagged ﬁrst differences are used as instruments in
the level equations, and lagged levels are used as instruments in
the ﬁrst difference equations (see Table 2). In addition to lagged
levels and differences, the list of instruments can include other
strictly exogenous regressors. For instance, to further improve our
estimation, we include additional instrumental variables to com-
plement the instruments generated by the GMM  procedure. So, we
included dummy  variables for each year and industry, according
to the stock market industry classiﬁcation published by the CNMV.
We estimated robust standard errors using the two-step version
of the system GMM estimator with a ﬁnite-sample correction3
(Windmeijer, 2005). The tests conducted conﬁrmed the validity of
instruments and the correct speciﬁcation of the model.
In Model 1, the lagged values of the dependent variable (ICI)
were signiﬁcant (1% level): that is, the amount of information
disclosed on IC depends on the amount that has been provided
in previous years. In addition, a higher percentage of women on
boards of directors (H1) exerts a positive inﬂuence on the level
of IC disclosure (1% level). When controls were introduced for the
other corporate governance and company characteristics variables
(Model 2), gender and the lagged dependent variable were signif-
icant (1% level). Additionally, for Model 2, there was a negative
relationship (10% level) between board activity and IC disclosure.
That is, fewer meetings of boards are more efﬁcient in delivering a
greater amount of IC information.ctors and disclosure of intellectual capital information. European
.org/10.1016/j.iedeen.2017.06.003
2 We use the routine xtabond2 in Stata.
3 We estimate using xtabond2 in Stata with twostep and robust options.
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Table 2
Panel-regression models.
Model  1 Model  2 Model  3
POOL  FE  RE System-
GMMa
System  GMMb POOL  FE  RE  System-GMMc System-
GMMd
POOL  FE  RE  System-
GMMe
System-GMMf
Intellectual  capital
disclosuret-1
0.901***
(0.023)
0.819***
(0.191)
0.857***
(0.162)
Gender diversity  0.200*
(0.112)
0.178
(0.108)
0.182*
(0.100)
0.227*
(0.118)
0.328***
(0.101)
0.207**
(0.104)
0.119
(0.111)
0.168
(0.103)
0.355**
(0.166)
0.605***
(0.223)
0.201*
(0.105)
0.121
(0.111)
0.186*
(0.103)
0.404**
(0.177)
0.710*
(0.426)
Board size  −0.008
(0.019)
0.006
(0.043)
−0.012
(0.027)
−0.023
(0.063)
−0.012
(0.033)
−0.253
(0.251)
0.380
(0.347)
0.086
(0.296)
0.14
(1.534)
−0.405
(0.655)
Board size2 0.033
(0.034)
−0.049
(0.046)
−0.013
(0.039)
−0.036
(0.207)
0.057
(0.087)
Board activity  0.059***
(0.018)
−0.005
(0.018)
0.013
(0.017)
0.117**
(0.051)
−0.053*
(0.029)
0.216
(0.131)
0.143
(0.119)
0.182
(0.111)
0.559
(0.366)
0.282
(0.704)
Board activity2 −0.023
(0.019)
−0.021
(0.016)
−0.024
(0.015)
−0.072
(0.059)
−0.044
(0.1)
Independent  directors  −0.073
(0.059)
−0.142
(0.112)
−0.086
(0.081)
−0.212
(0.238)
−0.202*
(0.12)
−0.066
(0.065)
−0.198*
(0.117)
−0.123
(0.086)
−0.562***
(0.2)
−0.201
(0.2)
Ownership
concentration
0.019
(0.031)
−0.231**
(0.091)
−0.063
(0.051)
−0.017
(0.068)
0.035
(0.114)
0.023
(0.032)
−0.226**
(0.091)
−0.057
(0.052)
−0.097
(0.109)
0.049
(0.102)
Size 0.011**
(0.005)
0.005
(0.034)
0.011
(0.009)
−0.028
(0.019)
0.021**
(0.01)
0.010*
(0.005)
0.011
(0.034)
0.013
(0.009)
−0.044*
(0.024)
0.022
(0.02)
Industry 0.064***
(0.02)
(omitted)  0.092***
(0.033
0.019
(0.036)
0.085**
(0.038)
0.055**
(0.021)
(omitted)  0.086**
(0.035)
0.064
(0.053)
0.063
(0.1)
Listing on sustainability
indexes
0.085***
(0.023)
−0.008
(0.017)
0.005
(0.017)
0.072*
(0.043)
0.063*
(0.035)
0.083***
(0.024)
−0.004
(0.017)
0.009
(0.017)
0.055
(0.037)
0.078
(0.061)
(Constant) 0.542***
(0.014)
0.544***
(0.011)
0.544***
(0.021)
0.541***
(0.038)
0.182
(0.112)
0.633
(0.39)
0.434***
(0.146)
0.523
(0.405)
0.384
(0.503)
−0.364
(0.790)
−0.045
(0.595)
0.097
(2.566)
Observations 125  125  125  125  100  125  125  125  125 100  125  125  125  125  100
R2 0.025 0.027  0.027  0.368  0.101  0.2423  0.380  0.128  0.074
Breusch–Pagan Lagrange  155.71*** 69.27*** 73.76***
F  test  20.35*** 13.62*** 13.10***
Hausman  (X2;  Prob  > X2) X2(1) = 0.01;  P  > X2(1)  = 0.9242  X2(7)  =  20.12;  P >  X2(7)  =  0.0053  X2(9)  = 20.29;  P > X2(9)  =  0.0162**
Wooldridge  Test  (AR1)  38.198*** 28.464***
Modiﬁed  Wald  test  11,278.50*** 18,454.56***
N◦ groups  25 25  25  25 25  25
N◦ instruments 11a 3b 24c 20d 23e 22f
Arellano–Bond  test  for
AR  (1)/(p-value)
−1.75
(0.080)
−2.49
(0.013)
−2.04
(0.042)
−2.49
(0.013)
−2.04
(0.041)
−2.22
(0.027)
Arellano–Bond  test  for
AR  (2)/(p-value)
−1.39
(0.165)
1.59
(0.111)
−0.16
(0.875)
1.56
(0.118)
−0.33
(0.740)
1.12
(0.261)
Hansen  test  (p-value)  9.08
(0.430)
1.60
(0.207)
11.97  (0.682)  7.81
(0.730)
8.30
(0.762)
7.59
(0.749)
X2 3.67* 2445.38*** 56.02*** 6164.80*** 70.48*** 13,649.91***
Standard errors are in parentheses. The square root transformation is used for board size & board activity variables. Logarithm transformation is used for size variable.
* 10% signiﬁcance.
** 5% signiﬁcance.
*** 1% signiﬁcance.
Instruments for ﬁrst differences equations and levels equation (respectively) are:
a D.(year, sector & gender variables) and year, sector & gender variables.
b L.gender variable; and DL.L.intellectual capital & D.gender variables.
c D.(year, sector, ownership concentration & gender variables), L(1/.) listing on sustainability indexes; and listing on sustainability indexes, DL2 ownership concentration, D.gender, D.L.intellectual capital, DL(2/.) size,
D.independent directors variables; and year, sector, ownership concentration, gender, DL(1/2) board size, DL(1/.) (independent directors & size) variables.
d L2.board size, L(1/.) gender, L(1/.) L.intellectual capital, L.independent directors, L(2/.) board activity variables; and listing on sustainability indexes, sensible sector, DL2 ownership concentration, D.gender, D.L.intellectual
capital,  DL(2/.) size, D.independent directors variables.
e Instruments for ﬁrst differences equation: D.(year, sector, ownership concentration & gender), L.size & L(1/.) listing on sustainability indexes variables; and year, sector, ownership concentration, gender, D.size, DL(1/2).board
size  & DL(1/.) independent directors variables.
f Instruments for ﬁrst differences equation: D.(board size2 & board activity2), L2.board size, L(1/.) gender, L(1/.) L.intellectual capital, L.independent directors & L(2/.) board activity variables; and listing on sustainability indexes,
sensible sector, DL2.ownership concentration, D.gender, D.L.intellectual capital, DL(2/.).size & D.independent director variables.
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etween board activity and IC disclosure. Thus, when more women
re on the board of Spanish listed companies, ICI increased, validat-
ng our general hypothesis, H1.
The variable “external independent directors” is related nega-
ively to ICI (5% level), consistent with Eng and Mak  (2003). This
uggests a substitution effect: the appointment of more indepen-
ent directors results in a lower level of voluntary disclosure. We
lso found that sensitive industries and larger companies have a
igher level of disclosure of IC information (5% level). The “listing
n sustainability indexes” also has a positive and signiﬁcant impact
10% level) on ICI. The control variables of board size and ownership
oncentration are not signiﬁcant.
. Conclusions
This study contributes to the corpus of empirical evidence on
hether increased representation of women on boards of direc-
ors leads to favourable outcomes for stakeholders and improves
oard effectiveness. The ﬁndings aid understanding of how gender
iversity increases voluntary disclosures (in this case, of IC informa-
ion) in listed companies. The results are consistent with a view that
ncreased representation of women on boards will improve board
versight, enhance transparency, and reduce information asymme-
ry in respect of IC information. The results partially vindicate public
olicy in Spain (and other countries) which impose(s) quotas on the
epresentation of women on company boards.
The ﬁnding of a statistically signiﬁcant association between
he representation of women  on company boards and levels of
C disclosures should reinforce global initiatives to revise corpo-
ate governance regulations by promoting gender diversity. The
ndings suggest that women directors improve board monitor-
ng and that this leads to improved transparency and increased
C disclosure. The ﬁndings can be explained using a resources-
ased perspective: women bring new skills and resources (different
ersonal-social attributes and gender-related values) to boards and
eem likely to be effective in prompting increased IC disclosure
Eckes & Trautner, 2000).
The Spanish Equality Law of 2007 appears to have had a com-
lementary corporate governance effect by reducing information
symmetry and improving the comprehensiveness and quality of
orporate reporting of IC information. Such an outcome should be
ontrasted with the negative outcome on levels of IC disclosure that
re associated with the inclusion of more external independent
irectors on boards. The latter has had a substitutive governance
ffect by leading to less information being disclosed about IC. Thus,
egulators should promote the increase of gender diversiﬁcation on
oards and should place less emphasis on the need to increase the
umber of independent directors.
Board size and ownership concentration are not signiﬁcant vari-
bles in explaining IC disclosure in Spain. Nor is there a quadratic
elationship (inverse U) between board size and IC disclosure; or
umber of board meetings and IC disclosure. Board activity seems
o decrease IC disclosure (10% level). Additionally, there is higher
isclosure of IC information in sensitive industries and larger com-
anies (5% level), and listed companies in sustainability indexes
10% level). Thus, we conﬁrm results reported by Oliveira et al.
2006) and Michelon and Parbonetti (2012).
This paper adds new evidence of the relationship between lev-
ls of female representation on a company board and levels of IC
isclosure. Those seeking better oversight and monitoring of com-
anies should support initiatives to increase the representation ofPlease cite this article in press as: Tejedo-Romero, F., et al. Women  dire
Research on Management and Business Economics (2017), http://dx.doi
omen on boards. The ﬁndings are consistent with resource-based
erspectives because they point to the skills, personal attributes
nd gender-related values women directors bring to companies,
mproving disclosure and transparency. PRESS
ent and Business Economics xxx (2017) xxx–xxx
The ﬁndings should be assessed mindful of the small sample
analysed. This was inevitable because the Spanish benchmark stock
market index of the Bolsa de Madrid (IBEX 35) is small. Further
research using different samples, or the same type of sample for
post-2011 outcomes, or drawn from similar and dissimilar cul-
tural and environmental contexts, would help verify the positive
effect women directors have on levels of voluntary disclosure of IC
information.
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